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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  We have now had more than a year to assess the impact of the 2006 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“the Amendments”) 
on discovery of electronically stored information.1  At the core of these 
provisions is the “two-tiered” discovery process.2  Under Rule 
26(b)(2)(B),3 restyled as “Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored 
                                                 
* Copyright © 2008 Thomas Y. Allman.  Mr. Allman, a former General Counsel, was an 
early advocate of federal e-discovery reform and currently co-chairs the Lawyers for 
Civil Justice State E-Discovery Committee.   He is one of the Editors of The Sedona 
Principles (Second Edition 2007) and can be reached at tyallman@earthlink.net. 
1
 The 2006 Amendments to Rule 34(a) added “electronically stored information” as a 
distinct category of discoverable information to update the 1970 amendments, which had 
expanded the definition of “documents” to include “data compilations” from which 
information could be obtained by use of “detection devices.”    
2
 See Final Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee of May 25, 2005 (revised July 
27, 2005), at page C-42, included as Appendix C to the September 2005 Standing 
Committee Report to the Judicial Conference, available at 
http://www.www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter “Final Report 
(2005)”] 
3
 Fed. R. Civ. 26(b)(2)(B) regulates all forms of discovery but identical provisions were 
added to Fed. R. Civ. 45(d)(1)(D) relating to subpoenas.  The reference to Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) in this article refers to both provisions.   
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Information,”4 a party is permitted to utilize information from “reasonably 
accessible” sources of electronically stored information to respond to all 
forms of discovery without seeking information from inaccessible sources, 
provided that they are identified.5  Reasonably accessible sources are those 
which are available without “undue burden or cost.” 
 
[2]  What can be said of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) after one year?6  The approach 
was motivated by the observation that “more easily accessed sources – 
whether computer-based, paper, or human – may yield all the information 
that is reasonably useful for the action.”7  Are parties actually producing 
and reviewing accessible information first in the average cases? 8   Is it 
helpful to require a court to evaluate “accessibility” and “good cause” as a 
condition of second tier discovery rather than simply directing the courts 
to apply Rule 26(b)(2)(C)9?  Whether a source is “reasonably accessible” 
or not, the “proportionality principle” found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) – 
weighing the perceived benefits against the burdens involved – may 
prevent discovery from being ordered.10  Isn’t the “good cause” 
requirement creating unnecessary work for the courts?   
                                                 
4
 Descriptive titles, but no text changes, were added to both rules by “stylistic” 
amendments effective as of December 1, 2007.  All references and quotations in this 
article are to post-stylistic revision versions unless otherwise noted.   
5
 The Rule provides that “[a] party need not provide discovery of electronically stored 
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of 
undue burden or cost.”  See Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 62 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(explaining that Rule 26(b)(2)(B) makes “explicit” the “obligation to search available 
electronic systems for the information demanded” and is only relieved upon a showing of 
undue burden or cost).   
6I have previously described the Rule in the pages of this Journal as “an innovative and 
practical resolution to the concerns identified…about e-discovery.”  Thomas Y. Allman, 
The Impact of the Proposed Federal E-Discovery Rules, 12 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 13 at *6 
(2006).  
7
 Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-42. 
8
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), Committee Note (2006) (a party “should obtain and evaluate 
information” from reasonably accessible sources before insisting on production from 
inaccessible sources”). 
9
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) requires that a “court must limit the frequency or extent 
of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or local rules if it determines [that] “the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. . . . “ (emphasis 
added). 
10
 See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 at n.7 (2d ed. 2007) ( Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) is 
identical to former Rule 26(b)(iii)).  
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[3]  Also, what has been the impact of the two-tiered approach on 
compliance with preservation obligations?11  
 
[4]  This article seeks to answer these questions through the prism of the 
reported decisions and the actual conduct of parties under the Rule.  The 
results of the reported cases to date are interesting.  It is difficult to detect 
any change in the outcomes from what would have been anticipated before 
the Amendments.  If a party is unable to sustain its burden of showing that 
the source of information is “not reasonably accessible,” discovery 
ordinarily proceeds.12  “Good cause” for discovery from inaccessible 
sources is typically not found when substantially similar information may 
be available on more accessible sources13 or if accessible sources are 
unduly burdensome to produce because of the volume or other factors. 14  
Some courts continue to resolve objections to discovery of electronic 
                                                 
11The scope of what must be preserved may be broader than that found on accessible 
sources and even inaccessible information may need to be listed in the initial disclosures 
required under Rule 26(a).  See Frank P. DeGiulio, Electronic Discovery:  A Practicum 
for the Maritime Lawyer, 19 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 1, 21 (2006-2007).  
12
 Autoclub Family Insurance v. Ahner, No. 05-5723, 2007 WL 248 0322 (E.D. La. Aug. 
29, 2007) (“Rimkus must make an evidentiary showing that the data sought is not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost [and subpoenaing party] is not 
required to show good cause to overcome Rimkus’s unsupported assertions.”) (emphasis 
in original); accord, Disability Rights Council v. WMTA, 242 F.R.D. 139, 147-148 (D.D. 
C. 2007) (holding that the considerations for finding “good cause” listed in the 
Committee Note provide an “overwhelming case for production of the backup tapes”); 
Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Lieberman (Ameriwood I), No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 
3825291, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006) (finding “good cause” to order inspection of 
hard drive).     
13
 Best Buy Stores v. Developers Diversified Realty Corporation, No. 05-2310 
(DSD/JJG), 2007 WL 4230806, *1-2 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2007) (reversing Magistrate 
order finding “good cause” requiring restoration of inaccessible backup tapes because 
information could likely be found elsewhere); see also Hunter v. Ohio Indemnity Co., 
No. C 06-3524 JSW (JL), 2007 WL 2769805, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2007) (citing 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) for the proposition that “a court is [authorized] to limit discovery if it is 
obtainable from another source that is less burdensome or if the burden outweighs its 
likely benefit.”).    
14
 See Ameriwood Industries v. Liberman (Ameriwood II) No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2007 
WL 496716 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2007) (refusing discovery from accessible source because 
of undue burdens involved). 
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information by balancing burden and benefit without reference to Rule 
26(b)(2)(B).15     
 
[5]  The two-tiered approach appears to have had, however, a positive 
impact on how parties manage their discovery responsibilities under the 
Amendments.  Early discussions, case management orders,16 and local 
rules17 routinely encourage parties to focus on the burdens of access, and 
anecdotal evidence indicates that parties are accommodating reasonable 
demands for limitations based on accessibility.18  Moreover, courts appear 
to be showing heightened restraint when there has already been a full and 
adequate search19 or when a requesting party has not demonstrated the 
absence of reasonably accessible alternatives.20   
  
[6]  In addition, there also seems to be recognition that preservation 
requirements for inaccessible information must be identified early or they 
                                                 
15
 See, e.g., Oxford House v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200 at 
*5(D. Kans. Apr. 27, 2007) (applying “marginal utility analysis” to backup media and 
determining that “[a]s the likelihood of retrieving these electronic communications is low 
and the cost high,” the objection to retrieval of the data should be sustained). 
16
 See Celexa and Lexapro Product Liability, No. MDL 1736, 2006 WL 3497757 (E.D. 
Mo. Nov. 13, 2006) (absent exceptional circumstances and showing of special need, no 
duty to restore sample backup tapes retained for purposes of litigation). 
17
 See NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO DEFAULT STANDARD FOR DISCOVERY OF 
ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION, APP. K (“Prior to the Rule 26(f) conference, 
the parties [should discuss whether] . . . electronically stored information [is] of limited 
accessibility [such as] those created or used by electronic media no longer in use, 
maintained in redundant electronic storage media, or for which retrieval involves 
substantial cost.”), available at 
http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/Clerk_s_Office/Local_Rules/AppendixK.pdf 
18
 When the author floated the question at a recent Georgetown Law Center E-Discovery 
Conference, numerous members of the audience asserted that the meet and confer process 
was yielding practical accommodations as a direct result of Rule 26(b)(2)(B).  
19
 See Palgut v.City of Colorado Springs, No. 06-dc-01142-WDM-MJW, 2007 WL 
4277564, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2007) (“[A]n adequate and full search” had already 
occurred). 
20
 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. 04-CV-5032, 2007 WL 2106098 
(S.D. N.Y. July 21, 2007) (refusing to order restoration and search of backup-up tapes 
because the requesting party had not demonstrated that responsive e-mails existed on the 
tapes); accord, Best Buy Stores v. Developers Diversitfied Realty Corporation, No. 05-
2310 (DSD/JJG), 2007 WL 4230806 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2007). 
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are waived,21 and that the principle of proportionality is equally applicable 
in the preservation context. 
 
[7]  Nonetheless, the “two-tiered” process can be cumbersome to 
implement, and there remain questions about its usefulness.  Thus, the 
article includes practical suggestions on how to overcome the remaining 




[8]  The ubiquity of computers in the storage and exchange of electronic 
information has led to an information explosion.22  The trend started with 
mainframe computers which had the ability to manipulate large volumes 
of information in the form of “databases.”  This inevitably attracted 
requests for production of information in electronic form and, in 1970, 
Rule 34(a) was amended to include as discoverable documents, “data 
compilations from which information can be obtained.” 
 
[9]  By the mid to late 1990s, however, the growth in discovery of e-mail 
and other forms of electronic information had overwhelmed the discovery 
rules.  An enormous volume of information23 was potentially available for 
discovery on active systems, backup media and, in some cases, as 
fragments on hard drives, greatly impeding the ability to manage 
discovery in rational ways.  The problem was especially acute because of 
                                                 
21
 See Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, No. 2:06-cv-01093 FMC-JCx, 2007 WL 2080419, 
at *14 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), motion to review denied, 245 F.R.D. 443, 447-48 (C.D. 
Cal. Aug. 24, 2007 (denying sanctions for failure to preserve information temporarily 
stored in RAM, where based on good faith belief, it was not required and no “specific 
request” had been made). 
22George Paul and Jason Baron, Information Inflation:  Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13 
RICH. J. L. & TECH. 10 at *47 - 49 (2007); Id. at *9 (“[caused by the] quick succession of 
advances clustered or synced together [including]…digitization,; real time computing; the 
microprocessor; the personal computer; e-mail; local and wide-area networks leading to 
the Internet; the evolution of software, which has ‘locked in’ seamless editing as an 
almost universal function; the World Wide Web; and of course people and their 
technique.”) 
23
 Id. at *12.   Other types of information phenomena, some of which “may yet even 
eclipse total e-mail traffic,” include instant messaging, word processing with hyperlinks, 
integrated voice mail in ‘.wav’ file format, structured databases of all kinds, Web pages, 
blogs, and e-data in all conceivable form[s].”  Id at *21. 
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the impact of preservation obligations on business practices involving 
routine overwriting of information.24  When set against the requirements 
of Rule 1, the practice of discovery under existing rules presented serious 
issues.25 
 
[10]  When the Civil Rules Advisory Committee and its Discovery 
Subcommittee26 turned to electronic discovery in 2000, it was confronted 
with a variety of conflicting proposals.27  Clearly, the discovery rules had 
to be updated to effectively carry out their historic mission.28   
 
[11]  For a variety of reasons, including uncertainty of the technologies 
which might emerge in the future, the Advisory Committee chose to make 
only modest changes designed to clarify that electronically stored 
information stood on the same footing as documents and reflecting best 
managing practices.29  As noted by one commentator, the Amendments 
                                                 
24
 See Public Hearing on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure:  Hearing Before the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States (Feb. 11, 2005) (statement of Lawrence La Sala, 
Assistant General Counsel, Textron Corporation) (stating that the threat that 
implementing even a legitimate policy could subject a company to sanctions, has delayed 
or even scuttled the implementation of corporate electronic data retention policies), 
available at  http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-
discovery/CVHearingFeb2005.pdf#page=369 (last visited Feb. 9, 2008). 
25
 See FED R. CIV. P. 1.  Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the 
rules be “construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.”  Id.  
26
 The Advisory Committee of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States charged with proposing rules 
under the authority of the Enabling Act. 
27
 Professor Marcus, the special Consultant to the Committee, has identified some of the 
ideas as including: (1) declaring that e-mail was not discoverable, since not a 
“document;” (2) mandating “reasonable” electronic recordkeeping; (3) requiring that 
backup tapes always be searched; (4) requiring that the requesting party always pay for 
restoration of backup tapes; and (5) mandating the exact form of production of 
electronically stored information.   Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward 
Brave New World or 1984?, 236 F.R.D. 598, 609-610 (2006). 
28
 See Prof. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE 
L. J. 561, 627 (2001) (arguing that “[t]o continue to employ pre-computer discovery 
standards . . . would be the technological equivalent of driving a horse and buggy down 
Interstate 94”).  
29
 See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, C-44 (“Parties sophisticated in discovery first 
look in the reasonably accessible places that are likely to produce responsive information. 
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“are intended to fill in gaps in the existing rules so that the task of 
conducting (and responding to) electronic discovery is less burdensome 
and more cost-effective.”30  
  
[12]  Included among the Amendments was a unique provision for the 
sequence of the discovery of electronically stored information embodied 
in Rule 26(b)(2)(B).  Appendix A [Evolution of the Two-Tiered Approach 
(1983 - 2007)] to this article details the steps in the amendment process, 
with links to the relevant materials.  
 
III. THE TWO-TIERED APPROACH 
 
[13]  The Federal Rules permit discovery as to “any matter, not privileged, 
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”31  From the high 
point of open-ended discovery prior to 1983,32 successive amendments in 
199333 and 200034 increased the managerial role of courts in discovery and 
the 2006 Amendments continue that trend.35   
                                                                                                                         
. . .  In many cases, discovery obtained from accessible sources will be sufficient to meet 
the needs of the case.  If [not], the proposed rule allows that party to obtain additional 
discovery . . . subject to judicial supervision.”).    
30
 Robert K. Lu, New Federal Rules on E-Discovery, 29 L.A. LAW 12 (June 2006) 
(“Strictly speaking, these new rules are not so much amendments as they are additions to 
the existing rules governing pretrial civil discovery.”). 
31
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  The discovery rules “allow[s] the responding party to search 
his records to produce the required, relevant data [but generally do] not give the 
requesting party the right to conduct the actual search.”  In re Ford Motor Co., 345 F.3d 
1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003).   
32
 The 1983 amendments introduced the “proportionality” principle to Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) 
requiring limitations on discovery when the “burden or expense” of the proposed 
discovery “outweighs its likely benefit.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).   
33
 The 1993 amendments limited the frequency of the use of specific discovery tools 
while adding initial disclosure requirements to Rule 26(a).  See FED R. CIV. P. 26(a), 
Committee Note on 1993 Amendments. 
34
 The 2000 amendments limited the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) to material 
which is relevant to the “claims or defenses” of any party, subject to expansion for “good 
cause” to encompass any matter relevant to the “subject matter” involved in the action.  
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), Committee Note on 2000 Amendments.   
35
 Scholarly comment has tended to see an inevitable trend towards increased managerial 
judging in this process.  See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the 
Federal Rules – And the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. 
REV. 191, 198-202 (2007) (“Discovery must be a fearsome Gulliver to require all those 
strings, and others that I may have overlooked, to tie him down.”). 
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[14]  Courts are required to limit all forms of discovery when the burden 
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.  Thus, a 
court must limit or deny unduly burdensome discovery whether the 
information sought is accessible or not.36   Even “active data or 
information” in electronic form can be unduly burdensome to discover.37   
 
[15]  In the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(b), the Advisory Committee 
established the principle, uniquely applicable to electronically stored 
information, that a producing party may ignore “sources”38 of 
electronically stored information which are not reasonably accessible in 
their initial discovery responses.  Rule 26(b)(2)(B) authorizes them to do 
so, provided that they “identify” any such sources to the requesting party 
which arguably contain discoverable information.39  The Advisory 
Committee believed that this was reflective of current best practices and 
that “stating in the rule that initial production of information that is not 
reasonably accessible is not required simply recognizes reality.”40   
 
                                                 
36
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 
26(b)(2)(C).”).  The Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) observes that “[t]he limitations 
of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) continue to apply to all discovery of electronically stored 
information, including that stored on reasonably accessible sources.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(B), Committee Note (2006).   
37
 See BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, RONALD J. HEDGES, AND ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS, 
MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES at 
8 (2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/eldscpkt.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 
2008) (stating that “active data may involve substantial burdens to produce – for 
example, when vast amounts are requested or when data are requested in a form that 
requires the reprogramming of databases.”). 
38
 Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-50.  The reference to “sources” was added after 
the Public Hearings in recognition of the concern that a party cannot describe the precise 
nature of inaccessible information for which it has not searched.  The Advisory 
Committee also added the qualification that the sources must be inaccessible because of 
“undue burden or cost.”   
39
 Id. at C-44.  
40
 Given that sources of information which are regarded as inaccessible may be subjected 
to discovery, a party must consider its preservation obligations even if it identifies a 
source as inaccessible.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), Committee Note (2006) (“Whether a 
responding party is required to preserve unsearched sources of potentially responsive 
information that it believes are not reasonably accessible depends on the circumstance of 
each case.  It is often useful for the parties to discuss this issue early in discovery.”). 
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[16]  A requesting party may nonetheless obtain discovery from 
inaccessible sources by filing a motion to compel and “showing good 
cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”41  Because the 
Rule is coupled to and includes the requirement that the court “consider” 
the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), it “carries forward to today’s 
electronic world the concepts of proportionality, balance and common 
sense embedded in the 1983 amendment to Rule 26(b).”42 
 
[17]  This “two-tiered” approach deliberately mirrors the structure 
included in Rule 26(b)(1) in 2000, which also invokes “good cause” as a 
necessary condition to enhanced discovery beyond that relevant to “claims 
or defenses.”43  
 
[18]  If party managed discussions regarding the scope of discovery do not 
succeed, either party – not just the requesting party – may bring any 
remaining dispute to the reviewing court by filing a motion to compel or a 
motion seeking a protective order.44   
 
IV. REASONABLY ACCESSIBLE SOURCES 
 
[19]  The underlying concept of the two-tiered approach is a distinction 
between information found on sources which are “not reasonably 
accessible because of undue burden or cost” and information available on 
their opposite, i.e., “reasonably accessible” sources.  Inaccessible sources 
may be ignored in party managed discovery although their existence must 
be disclosed through the identification process if they may contain 
                                                 
41
 While that Rule has three distinct segments to it, by far the most important and relevant 
one for these purposes is (iii), which provides that discovery should be limited if “the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into 
account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed 
discovery in resolving the issues.”  
42
 Letter from Arthur Miller, Professor, Harvard Law School and former Reporter to the 
Advisory Comm., to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
(Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/04-CV-219.pdf.  
43
 Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-43 (“The amendment builds on the two-tier 
structure of scope of discovery defined in Rule 26(b)(1) and applies this structure to 
discovery of electronically stored information.”). 
44
 Id. at C-50 (noting that the ability to seek a protective order was added to guarantee 
that either party could raise the issue). 
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discoverable information.  And, of course, if “good cause” exists, an 
inaccessible source may still have to be utilized in discovery.  
 
[20]  The Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) observed that “[i]t is not 
possible to define in a rule the different types of technological features that 
may affect the burdens and costs of accessing electronically stored 
information.”  Ultimately, the concept is an elastic one which has as its 
focus the burden and costs involved in providing discovery.  In Parkdale 
America LLC v. Travelers,45 a producing party sought to use the 
burdensome nature of privilege review as an argument for a finding of 
inaccessibility.  Had the argument succeeded,46 production could 
nonetheless have been ordered for “good cause,” taking into account the 
proportionality principle, but with limitations on the scope or timing of the 
discovery.   
 
[21]  At least three approaches are currently in use to help determine 
which side of the “reasonably accessible” line (actually more of a sliding 
scale) a particular source may fall.    
 
A. ACTIVE DATA 
 
[22]  One end of the accessibility scale is firmly anchored by sources of 
“active data.”  Information which is “active” is “immediately accessible 
without restoration or reconstruction,” and is typically stored on local hard 
drives, networked servers, distributed devices, or offline archival sources. 
47
  Principle 8 of The Sedona Principles (Second Edition 2007)48 contrasts 
                                                 
45
 Parkdale Am., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Of Am., Inc., No. 3:06CV78-R, 2007 WL 
4165247, at *12 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007) (stating that the party did not establish that e-
mails were not reasonably accessible under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) “particularly in light of the 
Court’s ability to apportion costs….”). 
46
 But cf. Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, No. M8-85 (PART 1) (CSH), 2007 WL 
473703 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (transferring a similar argument for decision to District 
Court where underlying action was pending).  
47
 The Sedona Conference Glossary:  E-Discovery & Digital Information Management 2 
(2d ed. Dec. 2007), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf; see 
also RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1996) (defining “accessible” as 
“able to be used, entered, or reached.”). 
48
 THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:  BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR 
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, PRINCIPLE EIGHT ii (2d ed. 2007), 
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“active data and information,” with “disaster recovery backup tapes and 
other sources of electronically stored information that are not reasonably 
accessible.”   
 
[23]  Some of the more exotic forms of active data have been found to be 
accessible where they can be accessed with minimal effort.  In the case of 
Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell,49 information which was temporarily stored 
in RAM was held to be accessible and thus subject to discovery.50  The 
District Judge upheld a Magistrate Judge’s order to compel production 
after applying Rule 26(b)(2)(B),51 while simultaneously agreeing that no 
duty to preserve existed.52   
 
[24]  However, even active data can be inaccessible for Rule 26(b)(2)(B) 
purposes when undue burden or cost attends its use in discovery.   As 
                                                                                                                         
available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf; 
see also Thomas Y. Allman, The Sedona Principle (2d ed.): Accommodating the 2006 
Amendments, FED. CTS. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2008).  The Sedona approach is 
analogous to that adopted by the Guidelines for State Trial Courts adopted by the 
Conference of State Chief Justices.   
49
 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMCJCX, 2007 WL 2080419 
(C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), motion to review denied, 245 F.R.D. 443 (Aug. 24, 2007) 
(requiring future production of information temporarily stored in RAM for less than six 
hours). 
50Id.  at * 7 (“[T]he court finds that it would not be an undue burden on defendants to 
employ a technical mechanism through which retention of Server Log Data in RAM is 
enabled”).  
51
 Id. at *13 (“[D]efendants have failed to demonstrate that the Server Log Data is not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost [and, in any event] plaintiffs have 
shown good cause to order discovery of such data . . . and the burden and expense of the 
proposed discovery does not outweigh its likely benefit…”). 
52
 Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443, 448 (C.D. Cal. 2007)  
[This decision] simply requires that the defendants in this case, as part 
of this litigation, after the issuance of a court order, and following a 
careful evaluation of the burden to these defendants of preserving and 
producing the specific information requested in light of its relevance 
and the lack of other available means to preserve it, begin preserving 
and subsequently produce a particular subset of the data in RAM under 
Defendants’ control.   
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noted earlier, in Parkdale America LLC v. Travelers,53 a producing party 
unsuccessfully argued that e-mail was inaccessible because of the 
heightened need for review to determine privilege.  While the argument 
failed in that case,54 other cases may require sufficiently excruciating 
review to lead to a different result.55   
 
B.  COST-SHIFTING ANALOGIES 
 
[25]  The Advisory Committee borrowed the “reasonably accessible” 
concept from cases that used it to exclude sources from eligibility for cost-
shifting.56  Not surprisingly, courts have continued to consult cases from 
that context, such as Zubulake v. UBS Warburg (“Zubulake I”),57 for 
possible analogies.  In Zubulake I, the court identified five categories of 
data, from most accessible to least accessible, as “active, online data;” 
“near-line data;” “offline storage/archives;” “backup tapes;” and “erased, 
fragmented or damaged data.”58  In W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst,59 the 
                                                 
53
 Parkdale Am., LLC v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Of Am., Inc., No. 3:06CV78-R, 2007 WL 
4165247, at *12 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 19, 2007) (e-mails were reasonably accessible under 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) “particularly in light of the Court’s ability to apportion costs….”). 
54
 But cf. Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, No. M8-85 (PART 1)(CSH), 2007 WL 
473703 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (transferring a similar argument for decision to District 
Court where underlying action was pending).  
55
 See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 789, 806 (E.D. La. 2007) ([quoting 
from Special Master Report] “Merck cannot be permitted to deprive adversaries of 
discovery by voluntarily choosing to electronically superimpose [its] legal advice on the 
non-privileged and, therefore, discoverable, communications”). 
56
 Under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), however, the concepts of accessibility and cost-shifting are 
“decoupled;” if undue burden or cost is involved in regard to discovery, a court may deny 
or otherwise adjust discovery or condition it on payment of discovery costs, regardless of 
the accessibility of the source involved.     
57
 Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 321-322 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003)(ordering sample consisting of any five backup tapes as selected by Zubulake and 
announcing a seven factor test to be applied after results of the sample became available); 
see also Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake III),  216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003)(ordering production from all backup tapes based on sample). 
58
 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318-19.  The court drew the line between accessible and 
inaccessible at “backup tapes, “because [they] must be restored using a process [as 
described] all before the data is usable.  That makes such data inaccessible.”  Some of the 
technological assumptions employed may no longer be applicable in the highly regulated 
and predictable storage classification world in which the Zubulake decision was decided. 
59
 W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, 245 F.R.D. 38, 43 (D. Mass. 2007). 
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court held that information was inaccessible by analogy “because of 
BeneFirst’s method of storage and lack of an indexing system.”  
 
[26]  Some commentators have suggested that parties should “game” the 
cost shifting cases to favor their accessibility positions, given that the cost 
shifting cases were driven by considerations which differ from those 
underlying Rule 26(b)(2)(B).60  
 
C. STORAGE TYPES 
 
[27]  The Advisory Committee listed representative storage types which 
were inaccessible in its 2005 Final Report.61  Thus, removable backup 
tapes, which require a burdensome restoration process before the contents 
are accessed, were listed as inaccessible sources of information.62  Other 
examples cited were databases not programmed to provide answers, 
legacy data, and deleted information requiring forensic retrieval.63   Some 
courts have applied these examples as accessibility benchmarks.  In 
Phoenix Four v. Strategic Resources Corporation,64 for example, 
information in a partitioned section of a hard drive was found to be not 
reasonably accessible by analogy to the “legacy” systems described in the 
Final Report.65   
                                                 
60
 In a candid article appearing in the publication of the Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America, it was suggested that “if a producing party cites case law applying cost-shifting 
tests to particular types of data, plaintiff lawyers should argue that these cases are not 
directly relevant to the tier-one analysis.”  Marian K. Riedy & Suman Beros, Win the 
Battle for Access to E-Data, 42 TRIAL 49, 53 (Dec. 2006)(noting that “[o]n the other 
hand,” a plaintiff lawyer should cite cost-shifting cases if they hold that it is 
“inappropriate for certain types of electronic data.”) (emphasis in original). 
61
 See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-42.  
62
 See generally Eric Friedberg, To Recycle or Not to Recycle, That is the Hot Backup 
Tape Question, 201 PLI/CRIM 205, 211-212 (2006) (discussing when and how to 
preserve relevant e-mails on backup media).   
63
 See WRIGHT, MILLER, & MARCUS, supra note 10, at §2008.2.      
64
 Phoenix Four v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ 4837 (HB), 2006 WL 1409413, at *2, 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) (stating that “proposed Rule 26(b)(2)[sic] reinforces the 
concept that a party must identify even those sources that are ‘not reasonably accessible,” 
but exempts the party from having to provide discovery from such sources unless its 
adversary moves to compel discovery.”). 
65
 See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-42 (referring to “legacy data that remains 
from obsolete systems and is unintelligible on the successor system.”); see also Palgut v. 
City of Colo. Springs, No.06-cv-01142-WDM-MJW, 2007 WL 4277564, at *3 (D. Colo. 
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V. “GOOD CAUSE” FOR DISCOVERY 
 
[28]  Rule 26(b)(2)(B) permits discovery from sources which are not 
reasonably accessible if the requesting party establishes “good cause, 
subject to the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”66 The invocation of a 
“good cause” requirement expresses a substantial hurdle to discovery.67  
The court must not only determine if need and relevance exists, but must 
also balance the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery [to 
determine] if it outweighs its likely benefit,” taking into account a number 
of considerations.68  
   
 
 
                                                                                                                         
Dec. 3, 2007) ( refusing to order restoration of inaccessible backup tapes because “the 
Defendant City of Colorado [does] not have the hardware to access them.”). 
66
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
67
 See Schlagenhaff v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 121 (1964)(while the Federal Rules should 
be liberally construed to grant discovery, “they should not be expanded by disregarding 
plainly expressed limitations” such as a “good cause” requirement).  A court should 
carefully weigh any potential disruption to business and information system activities 
which may result.  THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:  BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & 
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, PRINCIPLE EIGHT 
(2d ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf 
Resort[ing] to disaster recovery backup tapes and other sources of 
electronically stored information that are not reasonably accessible 
requires the requesting party to demonstrate need and relevance that 
outweigh the costs and burdens of retrieving and processing the 
electronically stored information from such sources, including the 
disruption of business and information management activities.   
Id. 
68
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).  The Committee Note suggests factors which may be 
appropriate for a court to “consider” in reaching its decision :   
Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity of the 
discovery request; (2) the quantify of information available from other 
and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant 
information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available 
on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, 
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily 
accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of 
the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation; and (7) the parties resources.   
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), Committee Note (2006). 
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A. CASES FINDING GOOD CAUSE 
 
[29]  In December, 2006, shortly after the Rule went into effect, the court 
in Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Lieberman (“Ameriwood I”),69 concluded 
that good cause existed to authorize the creation of a mirror image of a 
hard drive. The 2006 Amendments had “clarified” that Rule 34 authorizes 
direct access to this type of information.70  The same result was reached in 
Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc.71 because the moving party had 
demonstrated a “viable reason” for the discovery.   
 
[30]  In W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, L.L.C.,72 the court found good 
cause to order production of inaccessible claim files based on the 
“considerations” listed in the Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B).  In the 
case of In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation,73 a court held 
that there was “good cause” to order restoration of e-mail backup tapes 
because “it has not been demonstrated that [the e-mails sought are] 
reasonably available from any other easily accessed sources” and 
resources “are not an issue.”74  Similarly, in Disability Rights Council v. 
                                                 
69
 Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman (Ameriwood I), No. 4:06CV524-DJS, 2006 WL 
3825291 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 27, 2006). 
70
 Rule 34(a) added an express right to “inspect, copy, test or sample” designated 
“electronically stored information” to the existing right to do so with respect to “tangible” 
things.   See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a), Committee Note (2006) (“The current rule [was] not 
clear that such testing or sampling is authorized; the amendment expressly permits it.”).  
The Note further cautioned that “[a]s with any other form of discovery, issues of burden 
and intrusiveness raised by [such requests] can be addressed under Rules 26(b)(2) and 
26(c) [but] [t]he addition of testing and sampling to Rule 34(a)  . . . is not meant to create 
a routine right of direct access to a party’s electronic information system, although such 
access might be justified in some circumstances.”). 
71
 Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 WL 465680, at *2 (W.D. 
Mich. Feb 8, 2007). 
72
 W.E. Aubuchon Co. v. Benefirst, L.L.C., 245 F.R.D. 38 (D. Mass. 2007). 
73
 In re Veeco Instrumetns, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 MD 1695, 2007 WL 983987, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007). 
74
 Id. at *2.  It can be argued that the burden with regard to other sources of information 
should have been placed on the requesting party to show that the information was not so 
available. 
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WMTA,75 the Court held that there was an “overwhelming case for 
production of the backup tapes.”76   
 
[31]  The logic used to reach these outcomes is consistent with that 
employed by the decisions rendered prior to the 2006 Amendments.  In 
Concord Boat Corporation v. Brunswick Corporation,77 the court 
concluded that restoration of backup media was not warranted because the 
“questionable” gains were “outweighed by the substantial burden and 
expense of conducting the search.”78  In Zubulake I,79 however, the court 
ordered restoration of a sample of backup media selected by the requesting 
party, the results of which were subsequently held to justify full 
restoration.80   
 
[32]  Good cause has also been found in other factual contexts.  In Guy 
Chemical Company v. Romaco AG,81 the court noted that “there [was] no 
other location where [the requesting party] could turn to acquire the 
requested discovery.”  Similarly, the District Judge in Columbia Pictures 
v. Bunnell82 upheld a Magistrate Judge’s ruling that good cause existed to 
compel production of information temporarily stored in RAM because “it 
would not be an undue burden on defendants to employ a technical 
                                                 
75
 Disability Rights Council of Greater Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 
129, 148 (D.D.C. 2007). 
76
 Id. The court applied the factors listed in the Committee Note but expressed 
reservations about whether the benefits of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) could be claimed by a party 
which failed to disable features which automatically deleted e-mail after sixty days. 
77
 Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *9  
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997). 
78
 McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001) (adopting a marginal utility test 
utilizing sampling to determine if the necessity existed to order burdensome restoration, 
an approach echoed in Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake I),  217 F.R.D. 309 
(2003)).    
79
 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 323-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).   
80
 See Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 287 (2003) 
(ordering production from backup tapes based on results of sample). 
81
 Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 312 (N.D. Ind. 2007). 
82
 Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093, 2007 WL 2080419, at *3-6 
(C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), motion to review denied, 245 F.R.D. 443 (Aug. 24, 2007) 
(requiring future production of information temporarily stored in RAM for less than six 
hours). 
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mechanism through which retention of Server Log Data in RAM is 
enabled.”83  
 
B. CASES DECLINING TO FIND GOOD CAUSE 
 
[33]  Courts have refused to find “good cause” to order discovery from 
inaccessible sources where the potential benefits did not outweigh the 
burdens and costs.  The results in those cases are also consistent with 
decisions rendered under similar circumstances prior to the Amendments.  
 
[34]  In Best Buy Stores v. Developers Diversified Realty Corporation84 
the District Court reversed a Magistrate Judge’s order requiring restoration 
of inaccessible backup tapes85 after carefully analyzing the elements of the 
“good cause exception.”  It noted that the defendants had not argued or 
shown that the information was uniquely available from the database at 
issue or that it could not be more easily obtained from another more 
accessible source.  Similarly, in Ameriwood Industries, Inc. v. Liberman 
(“Ameriwood II”), the defendants failed to demonstrate good cause “to 
order disclosure of [voluminous] communications and documents.”86 
 
[35]  Other cases have reached similar results by simply referencing the 
proportionality principle.  In Oxford House v. City of Topeka,87 the court 
denied discovery because “the likelihood of retrieving these electronic 
communications [from backup media] is low and the cost high.”  
Similarly, a District Judge ruled in National Union Fire Insurance v. 
                                                 
83
 Id. at * 7. (“[D]efendants have failed to demonstrate that the Server Log Data is not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost [and, in any event] plaintiffs have 
shown good cause to order discovery of such data . . . and the burden and expense of the 
proposed discovery does not outweigh its likely benefit….”). Id. at*13 
84
 Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., No. 05-2310, 2007 WL 
4230806, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 29, 2007).   
85
 Id. at *3.  The court held that because of the high cost to restore and maintain the 
information the tape “is not at present reasonably accessible” and refused to hold that a 
duty had existed to preserve the information in accessible form merely because it was 
“potentially relevant to virtually any litigation . . . because of the quantity and nature of 
the information it contained.”   
86
 Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman (Ameriwood II), No. 4:06CV524, 2007 WL 
496716 (E.D. Mo. Feb.13, 2007). 
87
 Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200, at *5(D. 
Kans. Apr. 27, 2007). 
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Clearwater Insurance Company,88 that restoration of e-mails from backup 
tapes was not required under the facts of that case since “the expense of 
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”  In Palgut v. City of 
Colorado Springs,89 the court refused to order restoration of backup tapes 
where “an adequate and full search” had occurred and the “cost of 
restoration outweighs the possible yield of relevant and probative 
information.” 
 
VI. THE IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 
 
[36]  Rule 26(b)(2)(B) requires “identification” of unsearched sources as a 
condition of treating electronically stored information as not reasonably 
accessible.  The duty to identify extends only to those sources reasonably 
believed to contain discoverable information.  The Rule does not spell out 
exactly when or how “identification” must occur,90 although the 
Committee Note suggested listing the “category or type” of the source.91    
 
[37]  Failure to comply with this unique requirement could, in theory, have 
serious consequences.92   Some have, accordingly, argued that preparation 
of detailed “privilege-type” logs is advisable or even required.93  However, 
                                                 
88
 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Clearwater Ins. Co., No. 04-CV-5032, 2007 WL 2106098, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2007) 
89
 Palgut v. City of Colo. Springs, No. 06-cv-01142, 2007 WL 4277564, at *2 (D.Colo. 
Dec. 3, 2007). 
90
 The purpose of “identification” is to assist the requesting party to determine if further 
steps should be taken.  It was added to offset criticisms that “self-designation” of 
inaccessible sources is likely to be abused.  See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-
44 (stating that the identification requirement is “an improvement over the present 
practice, in which parties simply do not produce inaccessible electronically stored 
information….”). 
91
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), Committee Note (2006) (“The identification should, to the 
extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the requesting party to evaluate the 
burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive 
information on the identified sources.”). 
92Compare the result in Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto,  No. 
CV-F-04-6121 LJO DLB, 2007 WL 4365584, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007), where a 
court refused to entertain a motion to recover the costs of an e-discovery vendor because 
of a failure to raise the accessibility concerns by objection or motion during the discovery 
process. 
93But see Lee H. Rosenthal, “A Few Thoughts on Electronic Discovery After December 1, 
2006,” 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 178 (2006) (“[P]rivilege logs epitomize the 
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in most cases, identification needs will be met through use of one or more 
of the opportunities available under the Amendments to disclose the 
information.   
   
[38]  In some cases, for example, identification will be part of the initial 
disclosures under Rule 26(a).94  Initial disclosures of potential sources not 
being searched, known to otherwise be within the scope of the rule, must 
be made “at, or within, fourteen days” of the Rule 27(f) meeting,95 unless 
delayed by stipulation or court order.  Perhaps more typically, however, 
identification will occur as a byproduct of the informal exchanges about 
potential sources which naturally occur during development of a discovery 
plan prior to or at96 the Rule 26(f) conference.  Finally, formal responses 
to discovery can, and should, articulate or “identify” sources not being 
searched if they arguably may contain discoverable information.97  As 
suggested by Sedona Principle 4, “responses and objections to discovery” 
should clearly articulate “the scope and limits of what is being produced,” 
thus satisfying the intent of the Rule.   
 
[39]  No reported decisions have yet involved allegations of a failure to 
make “identification.”  
 
                                                                                                                         
worst features of discovery: they are expensive; they take forever; and when finished they 
are rarely used.”). 
94
 See Final Report (2005), supra note 2, at C-23 (“The obligation [under Rule 26(a), as 
amended by the 2006 Amendments] does not force a premature search, but only requires 
disclosure, either initially or by way of supplementation, of information that the 
disclosing party has decided it may use to support its case.”).   Compare the discussion in 
Frank DeGiulio, Electronic discovery: A Practicum for the Maritime Lawyer, 19 U.S.F. 
MAR. L. J. 1, 21 (2006-2007) (“[T]he committee notes state that even sources of 
electronic information that are claimed to be ‘inaccessible’ under amended Rule 26(b)(2) 
must be identified categorically in a party’s initial disclosures under Rule 26(a).”). 
95
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (“[U]nless a different time is set by stipulation or court 
order.”). 
96
 See THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS:  GUIDELINES FOR 
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION (2006), available at 
http://www.ksduscourts.gov/guidelines/electronicdiscoveryguidelines.pdf  (“If the 
responding party is not searching or does not plan to search sources containing 
potentially responsive information, it should identify the category or type of such 
information.”).  
97
 It would make sense to articulate the planned limits on discovery from inaccessible 
sources in sufficient detail to ensure that the position is preserved. 
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VII. CONDITIONS OF DISCOVERY/COST-SHIFTING 
 
[40]  Courts usefully employ cost-shifting as a nuanced tool to adjust court 
ordered discovery where the balance between benefit and burden is 
uncertain.98  The authority to issue protective orders under Rule 26(c) 
necessarily includes the ability to deny discovery or shift costs, regardless 
of the type of discovery sought or the accessibility of the information to 
the responding party.99  
 
[41]  A court which orders discovery from inaccessible sources for “good 
cause” under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) “may [also] specify conditions.”  The court 
can, for example, limit the scope and extent of the discovery sought;100 
stagger the sequence of discovery by requiring resort to the most 
accessible sources; order sampling of inaccessible sources to further assess 
the likely burdens and costs101 or utilize cost shifting to mitigate some of 
the costs or burdens involved.  Costs have been shifted, since the 
Amendments, in cases involving discovery of information on backup 
media102 and on hard drives,103 subject to a third party subpoena.104   
 
[42]  The Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) has been construed as 
cementing a linkage between a finding of inaccessibility and cost 
                                                 
98
 See Panel Discussion, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views from the Judges, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2007).   
99
 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)(A party “may invoke 
the district court’s discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‘undue 
burden or expense’ in doing so, including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting 
party’s payment of the costs of discovery.”).  
100
 See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630, 641 (D. Kan. 2006) (restricting 
scope of search required). 
101
 AAB Joint Venture v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 432, 444 (2007)( “[R]estoration of 
one-fourth of the backup tapes should be adequate to determine whether the tapes are 
liley to possess relevant evidence”); see also In re Natural Gas Commodity Litig., 235 
F.R.D. 199, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that legacy computers are to be tested by 
sampling).    
102
 In re Veeco Instruments Sec. Litig., No. 05 MD 1695 (CM) (GAY), 2007 WL 983987 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2007). 
103
 Thielen v. Buongiorno USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-16, 2007 WL 465680 (W.D. Mich. 
Feb. 8, 2007). 
104
 Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F. R. D. 310 (N.D. Ind. 2007).   
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shifting.105  However, “[t]he amended rule does not say that judges may 
only consider cost allocation if the subject of the discovery . . .is not 
reasonably accessible.”106  The result turns on the burden or cost of 
discovery, not the lack of accessibility of the source.107  Early cases 
refused to use “an ironclad formula” in light of the need for a case by case 
resolution.108  Not until 2003 did a court create a hierarchy of application 
of the factors while tying the right to consider cost shifting to the lack of 
accessibility of the information sought.109   
 
[43]  Pre-amendment multi-factor tests create unnecessary confusion.  As 
one court wryly observed, the considerations cited in the Committee Note 
merge the multi-factor cost shifting tests from prominent pre-Amendment 
decisions with a “duplicate[ion] [of] a step or two.”110  In Guy Chemical 
Company v. Romaco, however, the court noted that it was not required to 
follow any particular test or formulate where the need for allocation was 
clear under the circumstances - and exercised its discretion to do so.111  It 
                                                 
105
 Peskoff v. Faber, 240 F.R.D. 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2007) (“The obvious negative corollary 
of [the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2)(B)] is that accessible data must be 
produced at the cost of the producing party; cost-shifting does not even become a 
possibility unless there is first a finding of inaccessibility.”).  In a subsequent opinion, the 
court appeared to affirm its conclusion.  See Peskoff v. Faber, 224 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.D.C. 
2007) (leaving open the possibility that an alternative ground-waiver by failure to timely 
raise Rule 26(b)(2)(B) - also applied). 
106
 Rosenthal, supra note 93, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 167 at 180. 
107
 See David Lender, Cost Shifting Under the New Rules: Is The Landscape Changing?, 
THE FED. LAW., Aug. 2007, at 4, 5-6; see also Christopher Boehning and Daniel J. Toal, 
‘Peskoff,’ Cost-Shifting and Accessible Data, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 2007, at 5 (questioning 
the validity of confining cost-shifting to inaccessible sources regardless of burdens 
involved).   
108
 See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 463 (D. Utah 1985) (listing the reasons 
which persuaded the court to exercise its discretion). 
109
 See Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (announcing a seven factor test). 
110
 PSEG Power New York, Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., 2007 WL 2687670, at 
*11, n. 6) (N.D. N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007) (refusing to shift costs incurred when a discovery 
vendor separated e-mail from its attachments). 
111
 See Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG, 243 F.R.D. 310, 312 (N.D. Ind. 2007) (“This 
Court has discretion in determining the appropriate remedy, and finds is unnecessary to 
engage in such an analysis.”). 
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also left open the possibility that attorneys’ fees might be shifted under 
some circumstances.112 
 
[44]  The costs to cull and review material for relevance and privilege are 
as much of the costs of discovery as restoration, and can be unduly 
burdensome or expensive where the volume is high.113  Advanced 
techniques, which supplement the traditional model of individual human 
review on a document by document basis, are increasingly deployed either 
internally at a corporation or through hosted vendor service providers.114  
 
[45]  In Chemie v. PPG Industries, Inc.,115 the court held that because 
privilege review in that case was such a “daunting task,” the  costs of 
searching for documents and preparing a privilege log would be “open to 
further discussion [and] [i]t may be that some cost sharing is warranted.”   
In Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP,116 a party sought to shift all review 
costs, including “such privilege-related filters as [a] court may impose,” 
and Principle 13 of the Sedona Principles117 emphasizes that the “costs of 
retrieving and reviewing” electronic information may be shifted in 
appropriate cases.   
 
                                                 
112
 But see Zubulake v. USB Warburg, LLC (“Zubulake III”), 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (expressing the courts opinion that “only the costs of restoration and 
searching should be shifted” because, among other reasons, “any cost of reviewing” can 
be avoided by entering into “claw-back” agreements allowing parties to forgo privilege 
review altogether). 
113
 Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 5 Sedona 
Conf. J. 125, 131 (2004).  
114
 At the risk of over-simplification, these technologies, informed by knowledge of the 
issues in dispute, help identify key relationships and terminology and permit early 
analysis of and reduction in the volume (“culling”) of individual information requiring 
manual review for relevance or privilege.   The degree to which this process is well suited 
for accurate identification or exclusion of privileged information is very much at issue, 
with a spectrum of competing opinions in existence.   
115
 218 F.R.D. 416, 422 (D. Del. Oct. 8, 2003). 
116
 Stanziale v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, No. M8-85 (PART 1)(CSH), 2007 WL 473703 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2007) (transferring case to Delaware District Court).  
117
 Sedona Principle 13, supra note 48, provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the 
information sought is not reasonably available to the responding party in the ordinary 
course of business,  then, absent special circumstances, the costs of retrieving and 
reviewing t such electronic information may be shared by or shifted to the requesting 
party.” 
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XIII. THE IMPACT ON PRESERVATION OBLIGATIONS 
 
[46]  One of the key goals of the 2006 Amendments was to encourage 
early discussion and agreement on preservation issues.118    A producing 
party can face a Hobson’s choice between the burden and cost of 
preservation and the risk of sanctions for failing to adequately meet its 
obligations.  The mandatory meet and confer process required by Rule 
26(f) is intended to help by reducing post-discovery spoliation disputes.119 
 
[47]  The Amendments do not directly regulate the pre-discovery 
obligations to preserve potential sources of such information, a task left to 
the common law.  The mere fact that information exists on sources which 
are not reasonably accessible does not resolve the preservation analysis.120  
Parties may not “exploit the routine operation of an information system to 
thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to continue in 
order to destroy specific stored information that it is required to 
preserve.”121 
 
[48]  Emerging post-Amendment cases have clarified, however, that a 
requesting party disregards the opportunity to raise a preservation issue at 
its peril.  The triggering event is actual knowledge that the information 
will be sought in discovery.  Absent awareness of the need to act to retain 
specific sources of electronic information, a presumption of reasonable 
                                                 
118
 See Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal 
E-Discovery Amendments, 13 RICH. J. L. & TECH 9, 14-23, 26 (2007) (“ [A]bsent 
agreement with opposing counsel, unilateral preservation decisions about inaccessible 
sources always carry some risk of post-production challenge for potential spoliation.”). 
119
 See Michael R. Nelson & Mark H. Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of 
Applying Traditional Doctrines of Spoliation to Electronic Discovery, 12 RICH. J. L. & 
TECH. 14, 44-45 (2006). 
It should help to ensure that all parties are on notice as to the precise 
scope of their preservation obligations [and] encourage parties to strike 
reasonable compromises with regard to these obligations, in accordance 
with the . . . Committee Note’s statement that “[t]he parties’ discussion 
should pay particular attention to the balance between the competing 
needs to preserve relevant evidence ad to continue routine operations 
critical to ongoing activities. 
120
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), Committee Note (2006) (“A party’s identification of 
sources of electronically stored information as not reasonably accessible does not relieve 
the party of its common-law or statutory duties to preserve evidence.”).  
121
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 37, Committee Note (2006). 
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compliance attaches to steps undertaken by producing parties in good 
faith.122  In Healthcare Advocates v. Harding, Early, Follmer & 
Frailey,123 no duty to retain electronic screen shots was found when the 
producing party neither “knew or should have known” that temporary 
cache files would be sought in litigation.124  A similar result was reached 
in Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell,125 where the court refused to find a duty 
to preserve information in RAM, where the producing party had no reason 
to anticipate the claim, and the requesting party first raised it in a motion 
for sanctions.126  In Petcouo v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,127 the 
court refused to sanction a party for failing to impose an entity-wide 
                                                 
122
 See THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:  BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES 
FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, PRINCIPLE SIX (2d ed. 2007), 
available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf 
(“Responding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and 
technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own electronically stored 
information.”). 
123
 Healthcare Advocates v. Harding, Early, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 640-
41 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
124
 Id. at 641 (“[T]hey had no reason to believe that their activities would subject them to 
a lawsuit for ‘hacking,’ [and the failure to preserve] is not an action that shocks the 
conscience.”). 
125
 Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093FMC-JCX, 2007 WL 2080419 (C.D. 
Cal. May 29, 2007), motion to review denied, 245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007)  
(requiring future production of information temporarily stored in RAM for less than six 
hours); see Thomas Y. Allman & Kevin F. Brady, Can Random Access Memory Make 
Good Law?, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 10, 2007, at E1 (noting that a requirement to place 
information into a usable form for production under Rule 34 with a “modicum of 
cooperation” is consistent with existing legal principles, particularly when the 
information is not available elsewhere). 
126
 The magistrate judge held that “the defendants’ failure to retain the Server Log Data in 
RAM was based on a good faith belief that preservation of data temporarily stored only 
in RAM was not legally required” because, inter alia, there had been “no specific request 
by the defendants to preserve Serve Log Data present solely in RAM.”  Columbia 
Pictures, 2007 WL 2080419, at *14.   During a colloquy about the case at the 2007 
Georgetown Law Center E-Discovery Conference, the point was made by a magistrate 
judge that there may very well be occasions when the duty to preserve such information 
will be obvious, and steps may have to be undertaken to preserve well before discovery is 
sought. 
127
 No. 1:06-CV-2157-HTW-GGB, 2008 WL 542684 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 25, 2008) (“It does 
not appear that Defendant acted in bad faith in following its established policy for 
retention and destruction of e-mails.”). 
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preservation order on the deletion of e-mails, where the requesting party 
had not indicated the need to do so.128   
 
[49]  The focus should be on the likelihood of unique and discoverable 
information residing on the source at issue.  There is no duty to preserve 
duplicative information which may be available on more accessible 
sources.  As explained by the former Chair of the Advisory Committee, 
“[a] primary factor to consider [in deciding whether or not to act to 
preserve inaccessible sources of information] is whether the information 
likely to be found on those sources is also available on other, reasonably 
accessible sources.” 129  Thus, in Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O 
Lakes, Inc.,130 the court held that the duty to preserve “would not 
automatically include information maintained on inaccessible computer 
backup tapes.”131  In that case, the court relied upon testimony by the 
General Counsel that he believed that the information was available on 
other accessible sources.132   
 
[50]  Similarly, in Escobar v. City of Houston,133 the court refused to issue 
sanctions based on the overwriting of a tape of police communications, 
where the information was available elsewhere, and there was no showing 
of bad faith in the operation of the system.   
 
                                                 
128
 See also Marketfare Annunciation, LLC v. United Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., No. 
06-07232, 2007 WL 3273440 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2007) (refusing to consider a motion for 
sanctions because the preservation issue was not raised in a timely manner “as opposed to 
bypassing this step in the discovery process and seeking sanctions directly.”). 
129
 Lee H. Rosenthal, Not Reasonably Accessible Information and Allocating Discovery 
Costs, YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167 (2006).   
130
 Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 628 (D. Colo. 
2007) (stating that a reasonable investigation to identify and preserve relevant materials 
does not generally include inaccessible back-up tapes).   
131
 In Miller v. Holzmann, No. 95-01231 (RCL/JMF), 2007 WL 172327, at *6 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 17, 2007, the court noted that Sedona Principle 5 accurately captured the evolving 
case law and applied it to the case before it. 
132
 Citing to Zubulake v. UBS Warburg (“Zubulake IV”), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
133
 Escobar v. City of Houston, No. 04-1956, 2007 WL 2900581 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 
2007). 
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[51]  The presumption of rational activity in Escobar was reinforced by 
the provisions of Rule 37(e), formerly Rule 37(f).134  This provision was 
added to the 2006 Amendments to regulate rule-based sanctions for losses 
incurred as the result of routine operations,135 despite implementation of a 
reasonable litigation hold.136  However, willful continuance of a routine 
operation involving destruction, when preservation obligations are known 
to apply, is not an example of “good faith” operation of that system.137  In 
Disability Rights Council v. WMTA,138 the Magistrate Judge noted a 
failure (which the court described as “indefensible”) to prevent the 
automatic deletion of e-mails, including “possibly relevant and 
discoverable e-mails.”139   
 
[52]  Rule 37(e) represents a useful guidepost which balances the need for 
discovery with the practical constraints on information system operations.  
It is consistent with holdings in a majority of circuits,140 which hold that 
destruction of information pursuant to a reasonable records retention 
                                                 
134
 Rule 37(e), as renumbered by the 2007 Amendments without change in textual matter, 
provides that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as 
a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.” 
135
 See Thomas Y. Allman, Defining Culpability: The Search for a Limited Safe Harbor 
in Electronic Discovery, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 65, 66-67, 77-78, 82 (2007). 
136
 Comments 5c and 5d to Sedona Principle 5 recommend use of a “repeatable, 
documented” process in implementing “legal” or “litigation” holds, a topic which is now 
the subject of The Sedona Conference® Commentary on Legal Holds.  See The Sedona 
Conference® Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger & The Process (Aug. 2007 
Public Comment Version), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org; accord In 
re Kmart Corporation, 371 B.R. 823, 847 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ill. July 31, 2007) (finding no 
evidence that the party knew that discoverable evidence was been destroyed as part of the 
operation of its retention policies). 
137
 It is clear that a party may not “exploit” a routine operation “in order to destroy 
specific stored information that it is required to preserve.”  See Committee Note, Rule 
37(f).  The Committee Note points out that “good faith” may require active intervention 
in the routine operation of some inaccessible sources of information as part of a 
“litigation hold.” 
138
 242 F.R.D. 139 (D.D.C. June 1, 2007). 
139
 Id. at *146 (noting that users may defeat the automatic deletion by arching the email, 
which a majority of employees did not do). 
140
  See Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 
2004)(holding that “some indication of an intent to destroy the evidence for the purpose 
of obstructing or suppressing the truth” is required).   
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system is not spoliation absent a deliberate intent to interfere with 
litigation.141  
 
[53]  Finally, no duty to preserve inaccessible sources exists where 
disproportionate efforts are required which outweigh the potential 
benefits.142  Drawing that line is not easy.  In Cache La Pourdre Fees, 
LLC v. Land O’ Lakes, Inc.,143  the trial court faulted an entity for its 
failure to preserve hard drives of former key employees.  For that reason, 
effective use of early opportunities to discuss and confirm preservation 
steps undertaken is advisable.  
 
[54]  Meeting preservation obligations should be treated as part of a 
commitment to effective compliance.  Increasingly, entities that can afford 
to do so are dedicating IT personnel and counsel to the task of 
coordinating and managing the process.  This is usually accompanied by 
improved consistency in approach, better training of internal personnel, 
and enhanced processes and procedures. 
 
 
IX. METADATA OR EMBEDDED DATA 
 
[55]  Operating systems and software applications generate a variety of 
types of information, including “metadata and embedded data,” which are 
not typically visible to the viewer as part of the image visible on a 
                                                 
141
 While Residential Funding Corporation v. DeGeorge Financial Corp , 306 F.3d 99, 
107-8 (2d Cir. 2002) may be seen as more strict in regard to mere negligence, Rule 37(e) 
represents a collective judgment by the Rules Committees and Congress that a broader 
range of protection is preferable for policy reasons in the limited field of losses from 
routine, good faith operation of information systems. 
142
 “Electronic discovery burdens should be proportional to the amount in controversy 
and the nature of the case.   Otherwise, transaction costs due to electronic discovery will 
overwhelm the ability to resolve disputes fairly in litigation.”  THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:  
BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 17 (2d ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf 
at 17.   
143
 Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC 244 F.R.D. at 629 (“By wiping clean the computer hard 
drives of former employees who had worked on the [project], Land O’Lakes effectively 
eliminated a readily accessible source of potentially relevant information”). 
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screen.144   Access to and production of that information may involve 
burdens and costs yet to be essential to the resolution of an issue.145   
 
[56]  Discovery of metadata or embedded data is regulated by a hybrid and 
somewhat tentative approach in the 2006 Amendments, given the 
uncertainty of the Advisory Committee on the best way to proceed.146  
Increasingly, District Courts provide local guidance to ensure that the 
issue will be resolved by early agreement,147 local rule,148 or by the terms 
of a case management order.149   
                                                 
144
 See FED R. CIV. P. 26(f), Committee Note (2006).   The characteristics of the form of 
production roughly correspond to degree to which some or all of this type of data is 
included.  See Electronic Discovery Reference Model, Production – Form of Production,  
available at http://www.edrm.net/wiki/index.php/Production_-_Form_of_Production 
(distinguishing between production of electronic information in the form of Paper, Quasi-
Paper, Quasi-Native and Native production, with the least amount of metadata and 
embedded data (none) reproduced in “paper” production and the most in “native” 
production). 
145There are valid reasons for a party to prefer to produce information as an “image” 
without metadata, even though it might be more expensive to do so than simply 
producing in “native” form.  The process is complicated by concerns about the 
inadvertent production and receipt of metadata.   See generally J. Brian Beckham, 
Production, Preservation and Disclosure of Metadata, 7 Colum. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 
(2006). 
146
          The minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee reveal that the rule  
makers decided to remain silent on whether to require parties to 
produce metadata and preferred to leave the issue to the courts, 
presumably because electronic discovery was such a new and changing 
area of law that the Committee was not confident in setting down a firm 
and inflexible rule.   
Lucia Cucu, Note, The Requirement for Metadata Production Under Williams v. 
Sprint/United Management Co: An Unnecessary Burden for Litigants Engaged in 
Electronic Discovery, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 224 (2007) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 
Advisory Committee’s minutes, Apr. 15, 2005, *25, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0405.pdf).  The Committee was concerned 
about having the “unintended effect” of implying that metadata and embedded should be 
automatically produced.  FED. R. CIV. P. Advisory Committee’s minutes, Apr. 15, 2005 at 
*22, *25. 
147
 “Meta-Data, especially substantive Meta-Data, need not be routinely produced, except 
[by agreement or] upon a showing of good cause in a motion filed by the Requesting 
Party.”  See D. Md., Suggested Protocol for Discovery of Electronically Stored 
Information, 26 (unpublished report), available at 
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/ESIProtocol.pdf (alteration in orginal).    
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[57]  For parties litigating without guidance from local rules, Rules 16(b), 
26(f), and 34(b) collectively govern how parties are to frame the issue in 
advance of collection and processing.  While a party need not specify 
preferred form or forms for production, it is encouraged.150  The issue 
should be raised early if it is going to be material to a case. 151  In 
D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Group, Inc.,152 a failure of the original discovery 
requests to clearly request information in its original format, with 
metadata, was fatal to a motion to compel.153  
 
[58]  A producing party is obligated by Rule 34 to state the form or forms 
it intends to use.  Absent an agreement, Rule 34(a) provides that 
production should be made “in a form or forms in which [the information 
at issue] is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably 
usable.”154    
 
[59]  When a court must rule on the topic, a process of assessing good 
cause, subject to the proportionality principle of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), is 
                                                                                                                         
148
 See Wyeth v. Impax Labs., No. Civ. A. 06-222-JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *3 (D. Del. 
Oct. 26, 2006) (applying Delaware Default Standard approving production in imaged 
files). 
149
 See In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1769, 2007 WL 219989, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 26, 2007) (specifying format for production including metadata fields and providing 
process for resolution of disputes). 
150
 “Whether [metadata and embedded data] should be produced may be among the topics 
discussed in the Rule 26(f) conference.   If it is, it may need to be reviewed to ensure that 
no privileged information is included, further complicating the task of privilege review.”  
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f), Committee Note (2006) (alternation in original).   
151
 In Kentucky Speedway v. NASCAR, No. 05-138-WOB, 2006 WL 5097354, at *8  
(E.D. Ky. Dec. 18, 2006), the court noted the need for parties to discuss the topic in the 
Rule 26(f) conference and refused to require reproduction in native format where it had 
not occurred. 
152
 247 F.R.D. 43 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2008). 
153
 Id. at 48 (collecting cases and citing to blog arguing that “in order to obtain metadata, . 
. .you should specifically ask for it to begin with”). 
154
 In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. C-04-02676 CRB, 2007 WL 1827635, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. June 25, 2007).  “The rule . . . provides that the form of electronic production 
required under the new rule may be altered by agreement of the parties or by order of the 
Court.”  Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii)).  The choice of form or forms 
necessarily dictates whether and to what extent metadata is sought under the 
circumstances.   
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employed.  In O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc.,155 for example, the 
local guidelines provided that even where “Meta-Data” is relevant, “it 
[may] not be reasonably subject to discovery given the Rule 26(b)(2)(C)” 
factors.”156   A court should take into account the role that metadata and 
embedded data are expected to play, balanced against the burden and costs 
involved.157   
 
[60]  In performing the balancing required, a court should also consider 
the impact of any enhanced privilege review required if there is a credible 
risk implicating the privilege.  For example, cases involving patent, unfair 
competition, trademark, and antitrust often raise disproportionate review 
concerns where metadata may include privileged material.158    
 
[61]  Courts have successfully resolved a number of disputes since the 
2006 Amendments using this hybrid approach.  In Michigan First Credit 
Union v. Cumis Insurance Society,159 the court sustained an objection to 
production “along with intact metadata” because “production of this 
metadata would be overly burdensome with no corresponding evidentiary 
                                                 
155
 O’Bar v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 5:04-cv-000190W, 2007 WL 1299180, at *4 
n.2, n.4 (W.D.N.C. May 2, 2007) (basing Guidelines on D. Md., Suggested Protocol for 
Discovery of Electronically Stored Information 25, (unpublished report) available at 
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/ESIProtocol.pdf). 
156
 Id. at *4, n. 3. 
157
          Absent party agreement or court order specifying the form or forms of 
production, production should be made in the form or forms in which 
the information is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form, 
taking into account the need to produce reasonably accessible metadata 
that will enable the receiving party to have the same ability to access, 
search, and display the information as the producing party where 
appropriate or necessary in light of the nature of the information and 
the needs of the case. 
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:  BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR 
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 17 (2d ed. 2007), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_PRINCP_2d_ed_607.pdf. 
158
 See Jack E. Pace, III & John D. Rue, Early Reflections on E-Discovery in Antitrust 
Litigation: Ten Months Into the New Regime, 22 ANTITRUST 67, 69 (2007) (“[T]he costs 
associated with just the additional privilege review that would be necessary for each and 
every production of ESI (including metadata) could be staggering.”). 
159
 Michigan First Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, No. 05-74423, 2007 WL 4098213, 
at *2-3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2007). 
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value.”  Also, in the case of Schmidt v. Levi Strauss & Co.,160 the court 
rejected a motion to compel reproduction in “native, electronic” format 
because the “the apparent burden and expense of such an undertaking” 
was held to “dwarf any benefit,” citing to Rule 26 (b)(2)(C). 
 
X. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
[62]  Astute observers were initially critical of the “two-tiered” approach 
because undue burden or cost in discovery could have been addressed by 
the existing limitations on discovery found in Rule 26(b).161  Some argued 
that the addition of a “good cause” requirement would not alter outcomes 
and constituted a meaningless cosmetic change.162 
 
[63]  Fairly read, the results of the decisions applying Rule 26(b)(2)(B) are 
not much different from those which one would have expected under pre-
Amendment case law.  Although “good cause” is often dutifully (and 
mechanically) referenced, the courts are, in fact, focused primarily on 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), since it ultimately determines whether electronically 
stored information is discoverable, regardless of the accessibility of the 
source.163  
 
[64]  Thus, the question raised by the critics remains: was the Advisory 
Committee justified in introducing yet another a “good cause” requirement 
                                                 
160
 Schmidt v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. C04-01026 RMW (HRL), 2007 WL 2688467, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007). 
161
 See Comment 04-CV-179, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 
February 15, 2005, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/04-CV-
179.pdf. (“Rule 26(b)(2) already sets out the factors a court should consider in 
determining whether otherwise permissible discovery should be limited by the court.”).    
162
 See Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 89-91 (2007), available at 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v21/NOYES_Good_Cause_Is_Bad_ Medicine.pdf 
(suggesting that the Advisory Committee knew the good cause standard would be 
“toothless and meaningless” but was adopted as a “somewhat Solomonic action” to cater 
to demands of defense lawyers while reassuring plaintiffs’ lawyers that the court would 
rely on the “familiar and friendly mantra of liberal discovery to interpret the vague good 
cause standard.”). 
163
 See Panel Discussion, Managing Electronic Discovery: Views from the Judges, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 23 (October 2007) (stating courts may “pass by” the “almost 
mechanical burden-shifting procedure” because “even if it is accessible, the value is so 
outweighed by the burden here that I am not going to require production.”) (Francis, J.).   
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in the Federal Rules?164  It was certainly not a given.  After the original 
proposal165 was criticized, the Committee considered, but rejected, a draft 
which did not mention “good cause.”166  Both the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)167 and the Conference 
of Chief Justices168  have adopted that approach.169   
 
[65]  The “good cause” requirement has come to play an important role in 
party-managed discovery.  That process “offers litigants the opportunity to 
work toward agreement, rather than impasse, in defining the scope of 
                                                 
164
 See Judges, Lawyers, and the New Rules, 43 TRIAL 20, 22 (Apr. 2007) (“[I]n the end, 
we have to use the same test to determine whether discovery should go forward – the so-
called proportionality rule, which had been Rule 26(b)(2) and is now 26(b)(2)(C).  That 
rule provides that a judge can deny or limit or condition a discovery request that is too 
burdensome or expensive.”) (Hedges). 
165It was originally proposed that a court may “order discovery of the [not reasonably 
accessible] information for good cause.”  See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO 
THE STANDING COMMITTEE at 6 (May 17, 2004, revised Aug. 3, 2004), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf. 
166
 Id. at lines 1435-1512 (“[a] requesting party may obtain an order for discovery of the 
[not reasonably accessible] information by showing that it is consistent with [then] Rule 
26(b)(2)(B).”). 
167
 See UNIF. R. RELATING TO THE DISCOVERY OF ELECT. STORED INFO. R. 8(c) (Nat’l 
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Oct. 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/udoera/2007_final.htm. 
The court may order discovery of electronically stored information that 
is from a source that is not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or expense if the party requesting discovery shows that the 
likely benefit of the proposed discovery outweighs the likely burden or 
expense, taking into account the amount in controversy, the resources 
of the parties, the importance of the issues, and the importance of the 
requested discovery in resolving the issues. 
168
  See GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS REGARDING DISCOVERY OF ELECT.-
STORED INFO. R. 5 (Conference of Chief Justices, Aug., 2006), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf (“If the requested 
information is subject to production, a judge should then weigh the benefits to the 
requesting party against the burden and expense of the discovery for the responding 
party, considering such factors as:  [listing 13 factors].”).   
169
 California has issued an Invitation to Comment on e-discovery proposals which adopt 
a “good cause” requirement for discovery from inaccessible sources in Code Civ. Proc., § 
2031.060 (Protective Orders).  See Invitation to Comment, (LEG-08-01/W08-01) (Jan., 
2008), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/invitationstocomment/documents/w08-
01.pdf.  The proposal engrafts the amendment on a structure built on the NCCUSL 
Uniform Rules, Rule 8 (Limitation on Discovery), subdivision (c). 
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discovery for the various sources of electronically stored information 
potentially discoverable in their case.”170  Increased efficiency in that 
effort was at the forefront of the Committee concerns.171  Professor 
Marcus, the Consultant to the Committee, has explained that the Advisory 
Committee felt that absent an explicit “two-tiered” approach, a party 
would be required to filing motions for protective orders each time the 
accessibility issue was sought to be raised.172   
 
[66]  Thus, the answer to the criticism is not to be found by examining the 
outcomes of contested cases - they have not changed - but by looking at 
the day to day conduct of party managed discovery.   
 
[67]  Anecdotal evidence shows that parties have absorbed the value 
judgment involved.  The “good cause” requirement acts as a proxy for the 
judgment that discovery should concentrate on accessible sources and 
careful attention to be paid to balancing potential benefit against any 
burdens, if it is to go beyond them.  There appears to be a heightened 
attention to discovery from accessible sources before burdensome 
electronic discovery is required.  Parties are increasingly tempering their 
demands and reaching practical and effective accommodations under 
circumstances which did not exist before. 
 
[68]  On balance, therefore, and despite the cumbersome nature of the 
Rule, it would appear that the benefits more than justify the decision by 
the Advisory Committee to introduce the “two-tiered” system of electronic 
discovery.    
 
                                                 
170
 See Theodore C. Hirt, The Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule 26(B)(2)(B) – A 
Reasonable Measure for Controlling Electronic Discovery?,  13 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 12 at 
¶ 1, ¶43 (2007), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i3/article12.pdf (“[T]his 
Rule should assist the parties and the court in establishing a reasonable path through the 
electronic discovery process.”).   
171
 “Rule 26(b)(2)(B) does not create new authority for judges to limit discovery or to 
allocate the costs of that discovery.”  Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic 
Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 181 (2006).   
172
 Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 236 
F.R.D. 598, 614 (2006) (“Requiring a motion or court action every time a Rule 34 request 
sought information that might be contained on backup tapes or in legacy data could be a 
gross waste of judicial and litigant time.”). 




Evolution of the Two-Tiered Approach (1999 – 2007) 
 
Date Meeting, Report or Action 
1983 Rule 26(b)(2)(iii)(the “proportionality principle”) added to 
limit discovery when “burden or expense” of proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit 
1999 E-Discovery issues first raised at Public Hearings on then-
current Discovery Amendments 








Discovery Subcommittee Memo suggests adapting Texas 
Rule 196.4 relating to “reasonably available” information for 
use in Federal Rules (available at 
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/index.html) 
(navigate to Memo) (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) 
May 1-
2 
Advisory Committee authorizes Subcommittee to begin 
drafting e-discovery proposals (Minutes available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0503.pdf) 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008) 
Sept 15 Discovery Subcommittee Memo raises issue of requiring 
good cause for production of inaccessible data (available at 
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus09




“Conference on Electronic Discovery” held at Fordham Law 
School, New York City  [Draft Proposals furnished to 
participants] (available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_Conf_Agenda_
Materials.pdf)  
April  The Sedona Principles (First Edition) issued 
April 5 
 
Discovery Subcommittee Memo recommends requiring a 
court order before obtaining information that is not 
reasonably accessible (available at 
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus04
0604.pdf)(last visited Jan. 28, 2008) 
April  Advisory Committee approves concept of limitation keyed 
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15-16 to reasonable accessibility with good cause for discovery 
(Minutes available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0404.pdf) 




Advisory Committee Report (contains draft Rule and 
Committee Note) (available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2004.pdf) (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2008) 
June 
17-18 
Standing Committee Meeting approves draft proposals for 
publication (Minutes available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/june2004.pdf) (last 




Advisory Committee Report (May 17, revised August 3) 
(revised draft Rule 26(b) and Rule 45(d) and Committee 
Notes (Report available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment 




Public Hearings on Proposed E-discovery Amendments held 
in San Francisco, Dallas, and Washington  (index to 
comments and transcripts available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery.html) (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2008) 
April 
14-15 
Advisory Committee  revises proposed Amendments and 
Committee Notes (Minutes available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRACO405.pdf.) 




Advisory Committee Report (contains revised Amendments 
and Committee Notes) (available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/CV5-2005.pdf) (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2008) 
June 
15-16 
Standing Committee approves and revises Rules and Notes 
(Minutes available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/MinutesST_June_2005.pdf) 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008) 
July 27 
 
Amended Advisory Committee Report (May 27, revised 
July 27) (contains Final Rule 26(b) and Rule 45(d) and 
Committee Notes, as revised after Standing Committee 
Meeting [“Final Report 2005”])(see September, 2005). 





Standing Committee Report to Judicial Conference 
(includes: Standing Committee Memo, with Final Advisory 
Committee Report of May 27, 2005 (revised July 25, 2005) 
as Appendix C, together with Appendix F summarizing pros 
and cons of amendments) (available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf) (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2008) 
Sept 20 Judicial Conference approves Amendments and Committee 
Notes 
Sept 30 Judicial Conference Report to Chief Justice (recommending 
approval) (available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Supct1105/Summary_Propos




Supreme Court approves Final Rules and Committee Notes 
and transmits to Congress.(available at   
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Letters_Orders.pdf) (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2008) (full text of Rules and Committee 
Notes available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf) 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008) 
Dec 1 Effective Date of the 2006 E-Discovery Amendments 
(available at  
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscovery_w_Notes.pdf) 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2008) 
2007 
Dec 1 
Effective Date of 2007 “sylistic” Amendments (Text of 
amended Rule 26 and Rule 45 remains essentially identical; 
new descriptive headings are added) (available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1106/CV_CLEAN_FIN
AL5-30-07.pdf ) (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) 
 
